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The Supreme Court Of Canada And 
Constitutional (Equality) Baselines
ROSALIND DIXON *
In its approach to defi ning “analogous grounds” for the purposes of subsection 15(1) of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted an unusual 
mix of broad and generous interpretation, and high formalism. This article argues that one 
potential reason for this is the degree of heterogeneity among the nine distinct enumerated 
grounds in section 15. Heterogeneity of this kind can produce quite different interpretive 
consequences, depending on whether a court adopts a direct, “multi-pronged,” or a more 
synthetic, “common denominator,” approach to the question of analogical development. The 
Court, over time, has implicitly shifted from the fi rst to the second of these approaches. 
For comparative constitutional scholars, a lesson of Canadian Charter jurisprudence is thus 
that the number and scope of the analogical baseline categories in a constitution—and how 
courts approach their relationship to each other—can matter a great deal for the subsequent 
recognition of new constitutional categories. For those seeking to design broad constitu-
tional guarantees of equality, or other provisions containing express analogical baselines, 
the lesson is potentially even more specifi c: More may not always be better when it comes to 
encouraging judges to give effect to a preferred constitutional understanding.
Dans son approche visant à défi nir les « motifs analogues » aux fi ns du paragraphe 15(1) de 
la Charte des droits et libertés, la Cour suprême du Canada a opté pour un mélange inhabituel 
d’interprétation vaste et généreuse et de formalisme élevé. Cet article fait valoir qu’une 
raison potentielle en est le degré d’hétérogénéité parmi les neuf motifs distincts énumérés à 
l’article 15. Une telle hétérogénéité peut amener à des interprétations fort différentes selon 
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qu’un tribunal adopte une approche directe « concertée » ou une approche plus synthétique 
de « dénominateur commun » quant à la question du développement analogique. Avec le 
temps, la Cour, a implicitement glissé de la première à la deuxième de ces approches. Pour 
les chercheurs en constitutions comparées, la jurisprudence de la Charte canadienne nous 
apprend donc que le nombre et la portée des catégories analogiques de départ dans une 
constitution – et la façon dont les tribunaux abordent leurs relations les uns avec les autres 
– peuvent s’avérer essentiels pour la reconnaissance ultérieure de nouvelles catégories 
constitutionnelles. Pour ceux qui cherchent à concevoir de larges garanties constitutionnelles 
d’égalité ou d’autres dispositions renfermant des bases analogiques expresses, la leçon peut 
se préciser davantage : plus n’est pas toujours mieux lorsqu’il s’agit d’inciter les juges à 
appliquer une manière privilégiée d’interpréter la constitution.
IN INTERPRETING SUBSECTION 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms over the last nearly thirty years, 1 the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) 
has developed ideas about equality and non-discrimination that have attracted 
a remarkable global audience.2 In contrast, the SCC’s “analogous grounds” 
jurisprudence—that is, its approach to determining whether various grounds of 
discrimination are analogous to those explicitly enumerated in subsection 15(1) 
has received far less attention from comparative constitutional scholars.3
Th is article attempts to fi ll this gap in comparative constitutional scholarship 
by considering the broader lessons for comparative constitutional lawyers of the 
1.  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11. Unlike other provisions of the Charter that came into eff ect in 1982, the implementation 
of s 15 was delayed until 1985.
2. See e.g. Adam Dodek, “Canada as Constitutional Exporter: Th e Rise of the ‘Canadian 
Model’ of Constitutionalism” (2007) 36 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 309
3. Th e SCC’s approach has had some infl uence on foreign courts. See e.g. Larbi-Odam v 
Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-West Province) and another, (1997) 
12 B Const LR 1655 at para 19, [1998] 1 S Afr LR 745 (Const Ct). However, that 
infl uence has also clearly been far less signifi cant than in the context of other aspects of the 
Court’s approach to s 15. See e.g. Judge DM Davis, “Equality: Th e Majesty of Legoland 
Jurisprudence” (1999) 116 SALJ 398 at 404 (on the borrowing of the SCC’s dignity-based 
approach). However, that infl uence has also clearly been far less signifi cant than in the 
context of other aspects of the Court’s approach to s 15: see e.g. Davis, (ibid) at 404 (on the 
borrowing of the SCC’s dignity-based approach).
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SCC’s analogous grounds jurisprudence and, in particular, the lessons it off ers 
for ongoing debates in other countries about constitutional design, amendment, 
or both.
Th e SCC’s analogous grounds jurisprudence has been characterized, this 
article suggests, by two general features: fi rst, a broad and generous approach 
to recognizing various grounds as analogous; and second, a surprising degree of 
formalism at the level of constitutional reasoning. Th e SCC has consistently recognized 
citizenship, marital status, and sexual orientation as analogous grounds, despite 
signifi cant disagreement among the framers of the Charter over these grounds, 
and despite the reluctance of other courts, such as the US Supreme Court, to 
apply heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause4 in these contexts. 
Th e SCC has also recognized certain “embedded” or intersecting grounds (such 
as off -reserve Aboriginal status) as either within, or analogous to, those grounds 
enumerated in subsection 15(1). Additionally, the SCC has left open the possibility 
of recognizing certain other grounds on a more contextual, case-by-case basis.
Increasingly, however, the test endorsed by the SCC for determining 
whether a particular ground is analogous for the purpose of subsection 15(1) 
has been surprisingly formalistic, namely, a test of whether a particular personal 
characteristic is “immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal 
identity” (an immutability test). 5 In endorsing such a test, the SCC has largely 
failed to explain how either actual or “constructive” immutability6 relates to three 
broad underlying notions of equality to which it seeks to give eff ect under 
subsection 15(1): a commitment to anti-stereotyping, anti-subordination, and 
human dignity. Th e criterion of actual immutability, this article argues, bears 
little obvious relationship to any of the three underlying conceptions of equality. 
Th e idea of constructive immutability is likewise largely a normative conclusion 
rather than an independent test for whether a particular distinction off ends these 
values. 7 
4. US Const amend XIV, § 1.
5. Corbière v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Aff airs), [1999] 2 SCR 203 at para 13, 
173 DLR (4th) 1, McLachlin & Bastarache JJ [Corbière].
6. Th e term “constructive immutability” is used here as shorthand for the SCC’s notion that 
some personal characteristics are changeable “only at unacceptable personal cost.” See 
e.g. Corbière, supra note 5 at para 60. Th e label is imperfect, because as Part II notes, the 
animating concern here is about human dignity, rather than the fi xed or changeable nature of 
a characteristic. Th e language, however, tracks the SCC’s own formulation in this context.
7. Cf. Dale Gibson, “Analogous Grounds of Discrimination Under the Canadian Charter: Too 
Much Ado about Next to Nothing” (1991) 29:4 Alta L Rev 772; Wojciech Sadurski, Equality 
and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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Part of the aim of this article, therefore, is to attempt to explain this surprising 
combination of broad and generous interpretation with high formalism on the 
part of the SCC by linking it to the number and scope of enumerated analogical 
baselines in subsection 15(1). Th ere is, the article suggests, signifi cant heterogeneity 
of grounds in subsection 15(1).8 Several enumerated grounds touch on characteristics 
that are almost never morally or practically relevant for governments except in a 
remedial context (e.g., race, national and ethnic origin, and colour). Others involve 
characteristics that may be more frequently relevant, at least in the context of 
certain purportedly real physical diff erences (e.g., sex and physical disability), 
or for the purposes of appropriate government support or accommodation (e.g., 
sex, religion and disability). Others are based on characteristics that are more 
pervasively relevant (e.g., age). Further, while most grounds are expressed in 
symmetric terms (e.g., race, national and ethnic origin, colour, sex, and age), 
some (i.e., mental and physical disability) are expressed in more asymmetric, 
disadvantage-focused terms.
In the face of such heterogeneity, it matters a great deal how courts seek 
to analogize from existing constitutional baselines. Courts, the article suggests, 
have a choice in this context between at least two general approaches: one that 
allows direct analogies to be drawn between a new constitutional claim and one 
or more existing constitutional categories or sub-groups of categories (a “direct” 
or “multi-pronged approach”); and another that, fi rst, requires consideration of 
what the existing constitutional categories have in common, and only then 
considers whether a new constitutional category shares those features (a “synthetic” 
or “common denominator” approach). Th e two approaches will lead to quite 
diff erent interpretive responses by courts to heterogeneous grounds.
Under a multi-pronged approach, the heterogeneous grounds will tend to 
lead to an expansive approach by courts to recognizing new constitutional claims 
as analogous; the greater the number of diverse categories recognized by a 
constitution, the greater the likelihood that a new category will share something 
in common with at least one of those categories. Under a more synthetic, 
common denominator approach, in contrast, the same heterogeneity is likely 
to lead to greater abstraction in the level at which courts construe the criteria 
for recognizing new constitutional categories as analogous. Abstract criteria of 
this kind will also often have little connection to underlying substantive 
constitutional concerns or commitments, and thus lead to a distinctly formalist 
approach. 
8. Compare e.g. Robert Leckey, “Chosen Discrimination” (2002) 18 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 445 at 
446, 448-54.
DIXON, CONSTITUTIONAL (EQUALITY) BASELINES 641
Support for this proposition can be found in a broader comparative context, 
but is also the central lesson of the SCC’s analogous grounds jurisprudence under 
subsection 15(1). In almost all of the early cases recognizing new grounds as 
analogous, the SCC or lower courts adopted some version of a multi-pronged 
approach: Th ey either employed tests that relied on an implicit analogy to only 
some of the enumerated grounds in subsection 15(1), or used a multi-factorial 
test that relied on shared characteristics of sub-groups of enumerated grounds. In 
more recent cases, however, the SCC has been more formalistic in its reasoning 
and has shifted towards a more synthetic, common denominator approach. Th is 
shift, the article suggests, has potentially important implications for debates in 
other jurisdictions about the relevance of amendments to a constitution’s equality 
clause and for debates over the design of such clauses more generally.
Th e article proceeds in four parts. Part I sets out the major decisions of the 
SCC recognizing new grounds of discrimination as analogous for the purposes of 
section 15, and explains how such cases contributed to a pattern of broad 
and generous interpretation on the part of the SCC. Part II contrasts this 
interpretive approach with a pattern of increasingly formalist reasoning on the 
part of the SCC in this same context and with the increasingly narrow application of 
such formalist reasoning by provincial courts in cases involving certain kinds 
of economic- or poverty-based claims to substantive equality. Part III connects 
the patterns in Parts I and II to the two potential approaches by courts to the 
analogical baselines in a constitution, and shows how one approach (the 
multi-pronged approach) helps explain the SCC’s generous approach, while 
the second (the synthetic approach) explains its formalism. Part IV concludes 
by considering the importance of these Canadian lessons for ongoing debates 
among American constitutional scholars about the relevance, or irrelevance, of 
proposed constitutional amendments such as the 1972 Equal Rights Amendment, 
and for the design and redesign of constitutional baselines more generally.9
I. A BROAD APPROACH TO ANALOGOUS GROUNDS
In interpreting the Charter’s guarantee of equality, the SCC has generally taken a 
broad approach to recognizing various grounds of discrimination as analogous to 
those enumerated in subsection 15(1).
Subsection 15(1) explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of nine 
listed, or “enumerated,” grounds: race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
9. HRJ Res 208, 92d Cong, 2d Sess, 86 Stat 1523 [ERA].
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sex, age, and mental or physical disability.10 By recognizing various grounds as 
analogous to these express grounds, the SCC has extended this list to include 
discrimination based on citizenship, marital status, sexual orientation, and 
off -reserve Aboriginal status.
In Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, 11 for example, the SCC considered 
a challenge under subsection 15(1) to provisions of the British Columbia Barristers 
and Solicitors Act limiting admission as a solicitor in the province to Canadian 
citizens. While dividing on the issue of reasonableness under section 1 of the 
Charter, the SCC was unanimous in upholding the validity of the plaintiff ’s claim 
of discrimination based on an analogous ground. Non-citizens who were lawful 
permanent residents of Canada, Justice McIyntre held, were a “discrete and insular 
minority” of the kind within the protection of section 15.12 Indeed, citizenship 
more generally was held, according to Justice La Forest, to be a ground “similar 
to those enumerated in s. 15.”13
 In Miron v Trudel, 14 the SCC considered an equality challenge by parties to 
a heterosexual common law relationship to provisions of the Ontario Insurance Act 
requiring insurers to provide benefi ts to the (legal) spouse of a person killed or injured 
in an auto accident. In upholding the challenge, the SCC explicitly recognized marital 
status, and in particular non-married status, as a ground analogous to those in 
subsection 15(1). Four justices in the majority held that “the characteristic of 
being unmarried—of not having contracted a marriage in a manner recognized by 
the state—constitutes a ground of discrimination within the ambit of s. 15(1).”15 
Th e remaining justices were also willing to recognize that distinctions based on 
marital status, or between marriage and “relationships analogous to marriage,” 
may violate subsection 15(1) in at least some cases: Four dissenting justices held 
that marital status is an analogous ground at least in contexts where the particu-
lar laws under challenge did not seek to defi ne marriage itself, or its rights and 
10. Th e word “enumerated” is, of course, somewhat misleading in this context, given that the 
list of grounds is open-ended. Th e term, however, is the prevailing one used to describe the 
express grounds of prohibited discrimination in s 15(1). 
11. [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews cited to SCR].
12. Ibid at para 31. Th e description of non-citizens in these terms is not necessarily descriptively 
accurate, given that non-citizens are often quite strongly integrated into the social and 
economic community of a country. However, the term is often used as shorthand for a 
concern about the political powerlessness of such groups, in terms of their inability to vote 
and their limited success in forming broader political coalitions. 
13. Ibid at para 75.
14. [1995] 2 SCR 418, 124 DLR (4th) 693 [Miron cited to SCR].
15. Ibid at para 150, McLachlin J with Sopinka, Cory, & Iacobucci JJ concurring.
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obligations;16 and in her concurring judgment, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé sug-
gested that such distinctions were frequently, though not always, a violation of 
section 15.17
In Egan v Canada, 18 the SCC considered a challenge to provisions of the 
Old Age Security Act19 providing for the payment of a statutory allowance to the 
“spouse” of a person receiving a pension under the Act whose income fell below 
a certain level, but not the same-sex partner of a pensioner in the same 
position. While a majority of the SCC ultimately rejected the claim and found 
that the relevant discrimination was justifi ed under section 1, the SCC was again 
unanimous in accepting the claim of prima facie discrimination under subsection 
15(1). Th is, as Justice La Forest noted, also clearly meant accepting the concession by 
the Attorney General of Canada that sexual orientation is an analogous ground 
for the purposes of subsection 15(1).20 In upholding a similar subsection 15(1) 
challenge to the scope of provincial human rights legislation in Vriend v Alberta, 21 
the SCC again affi  rmed that sexual orientation is “analogous to the other 
personal characteristics enumerated in s. 15(1)” and thus the failure to protect 
the plaintiff  against dismissal from employment based on his sexual orientation 
violated subsection 15(1).22
Th e “generosity” of this approach is particularly clear when viewed in a 
broader historical and comparative context. One of the key issues surrounding 
the drafting of subsection 15(1), for example, was whether it would include sexual 
orientation as an enumerated ground. 23 Feminist groups in particular argued for 
the inclusion of marital status as an enumerated ground, but were defeated by 
those who favoured a more limited equality guarantee. 24 In fact, the very concept 
16. Ibid at para 26, Gonthier J with Lamer CJ, La Forest & Major JJ dissenting.
17. See ibid at para 91 (eschewing over-reliance on the idea of analogous grounds, but endorsing 
reasoning of a similar kind as part of a contextual analysis of the nature of the group aff ected 
by the law).
18. [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 DLR (4th) 609 [Egan cited to SCR].
19. RSC 1985, c O-9.
20. Ibid at para 5.
21. [1998] 1 SCR 493, 156 DLR (4th) 385 [Vriend cited to SCR].
22. Ibid at para 90, Cory and Iacobucci JJ.
23. See Mary Eberts, “Section 15: Th e Next Twenty Years” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 47 at 48; 
Douglas Elliott, “Secrets of the Lavender Mafi a: Personal Refl ections on Social Activism and 
the Charter” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 97 at 105.
24. See Doris Anderson, “Th e Adoption of Section 15: Origins and Aspirations” (2006) 5:1 JL 
& Equality 39 at 41. See generally Hon Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “It Takes a Vision: Th e 
Constitutionalization of Equality in Canada” (2002) 14:2 Yale JL & Feminism 363 at 366-
67 (regarding the infl uence of women’s groups on the drafting of s 15).
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of subsection 15(1) as an analogical baseline, or non-exhaustive list of prohibited 
grounds, emerged out of this controversy as a compromise between those who 
favoured an expansive defi nition of equality in the context of sexual orientation 
and family status and those who favoured a limited or conservative one.25
In the United States, courts have been far more reluctant to recognize grounds 
such as sexual orientation as “analogous” to race for the purpose of heightened 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. In Romer v Evans,26 for example, the 
Supreme Court of the United States ultimately struck down an attempt by the 
state of Colorado (by popular initiative) to prevent the adoption of anti-discrimination 
laws designed to protect gay and lesbian individuals. However, in doing so, the 
Court relied almost entirely on the fact that the law in question showed clear 
animus toward gay and lesbian people and imposed a highly unusual restriction 
on access to the (benefi ts) of the political process. It did not suggest that distinctions 
based on sexual orientation were analogous to race or other quasi-suspect 
classifi cations in deserving heightened scrutiny. On the contrary, Justice Kennedy 
suggested, for the majority, that the Court was simply applying an ordinary form 
of rational basis review.27
In Canada, the SCC has also been willing to recognize certain “embedded,” 
or intersectional, grounds of discrimination as analogous for the purposes of subsection 
15(1). In Corbière,28 for example, the SCC was asked to fi nd discrimination 
contrary to subsection 15(1) in various provisions of the Indian Act 29 restricting 
the right to vote in Aboriginal band elections to those living on a reserve. In 
upholding the challenge, the SCC held that although the grounds of “Aboriginal 
residenc[y]” or “off -reserve status” could only apply to a “subset of the population,” 
this was no bar to their recognition as analogous grounds. “Embedded analogous 
grounds,” it held, were sometimes necessary to “permit meaningful consideration 
of intra-group discrimination.”30
Likewise, in Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)31 the 
SCC considered a challenge to provisions of the Canada Pension Plan that denied 
a death benefi t to individuals who, at the time of their spouse’s death, were under 
25. Elliott, supra note 23 at 105; Eberts, supra note 23 at 48.
26. 517 US 620 (1996), 116 S Ct 1620 [Romer cited to US].
27. Ibid at 631-32 (noting that the Court avoids unduly broad review on the Equal Protection 
Clause by applying rational basis review wherever a law “neither burdens a fundamental right 
nor targets a suspect class”).
28. Supra note 5.
29. RSC 1985, c I-5.
30. Ibid at paras 14-15, McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.
31. [1999] 1 SCR 497, 170 DLR (4th) 1 [Law cited to SCR].
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thirty and did not have children or a relevant disability. Justice Iacobucci held 
that if the relevant pension plan did not discriminate on age alone, it could be 
seen as discriminating on a “combination,” or “confl uence,” of grounds that was 
itself analogous to the distinct enumerated grounds in subsection 15(1).32
In rejecting such grounds as provincial residency and membership in the 
armed forces as analogous for the purposes of subsection 15(1), the SCC has 
nonetheless left open the possibility that these grounds might be treated as 
analogous in the future. In R v Turpin,33 for example, the SCC rejected the status 
of persons charged with murder outside of Alberta as an analogous ground for the 
purposes of subsection 15(1). Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Wilson clarifi ed 
that she was not suggesting that “a person’s province of residence or place of trial 
could not in some circumstances be a personal characteristic of the individual or 
group capable of constituting a[n analogous] ground of discrimination.” 34 Similarly, 
in R v Généreux,35 in rejecting the subsection 15(1) claim of a member of the 
armed services facing trial by court martial for possession of narcotics, the SCC 
held that it was not suggesting “that military personnel can never be the objects 
of disadvantage or discrimination in a manner that could bring them [as a class] 
within” the scope of subsection 15(1), or make them a class of persons analogous to 
those enumerated in subsection 15(1).36
Th is, of course, is not to say that the SCC could not have been more 
generous in its approach to subsection 15(1) in these or other contexts. 37 Justice 
32. Ibid at paras 93-94.
33. [1989] 1 SCR 1296, 96 NR 115 [Turpin cited to SCR].
34. Ibid at para 53. See also ibid at para 52. Among the “indicia of discrimination,” Justice 
Wilson cited “stereotyping, historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social 
prejudice”[emphasis added]. Th is in part refl ects a concern about the need to ensure a 
forward- and backward-looking approach to disadvantage, but also introduces some analytic 
blurring of categories.
35. [1992] 1 SCR 259, 88 DLR (4th) 110 [Généreux cited to SCR].
36. Ibid at para 104, Lamer CJ [emphasis in original].
37. For criticisms of the SCC’s approach to s 15(1) as overly focused on the comparator group 
requirement, see e.g. Daphne Gilbert & Diana Majury, “Critical Comparisons: Th e Supreme 
Court of Canada Dooms Section 15” (2006) 24:1 Windsor YB Access Just 111; Sophia Reibetanz 
Moreau, “Equality Rights and the Relevance of Comparator Groups” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 
81. Th e SCC has also been criticized for placing too much weight on internal limitations under 
s 15(1), as opposed to a more general limitation approach under s 1. See e.g. Peter W Hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada 2d ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 800-801 (advocating the 
latter approach). See generally Leon E Trakman, “Section 15: Equality? Where?” (1995) 6:4 
Constitutional Forum 112. Others suggest that the SCC has a mixed record in this context. See 
e.g. Bruce Ryder, Cidalia C Faria & Emily Lawrence, “What’s Law Good For? An Empirical 
Overview of Charter Equality Rights Decisions” (2004) 24 Sup Ct L R (2d) 103.
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L’Heureux-Dubé, for example, undoubtedly took a more expansive approach to 
the analogous grounds requirement under subsection 15(1) than did most other 
justices, in that she adopted a more direct and contextualized focus on the 
nature of the group aff ected by a particular distinction.38 In doing so, however, 
she clearly went beyond simply extending the analogous grounds requirement so 
as to give it a more generous, dignity-based reading, but explicitly abandoned the 
analogous grounds requirement as part of the subsection 15(1) analysis.39 
In general, therefore, it seems fair to say that the SCC’s approach to the 
recognition of analogous grounds has accorded with its more general commitment 
under subsection 15(1) to “a broad and generous approach” to enforcing the 
Charter’s guarantee of equality.40 
II. SURPRISING FORMALISM
Yet, over time, in its reasoning on the scope of analogous grounds, the SCC has 
shifted towards a surprisingly formalist approach that has little clear connection 
to questions of substance or to any underlying substantive theory, or understanding, 
of equality endorsed by the SCC itself.41
Th ree broad underlying understandings of equality emerge in the SCC’s case 
law on subsection 15(1): (i) the idea of equality as treatment based on individual 
merit and characteristics, rather than stereotypical assumptions or prejudices 
(anti-stereotyping); (ii) the idea of equality as equal standing and access to political 
and economic resources and opportunities for all groups, thus giving rise to a 
situation in which no group is systematically disadvantaged or subordinated by, 
or when compared to, another (anti-subordination); and (iii) the idea of equality 
as a commitment to equal concern and respect for all citizens (equal dignity).42
38. See e.g. Miron, supra note 14; Corbière, supra note 5. For praise of this approach as better 
realizing the ideal of substantive equality, see Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking 
Section 15 of the Charter” (2003) 48:4 McGill LJ 627; Daphne Gilbert, “Unequalled: 
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé’s Vision of Equality and Section 15 of the Charter” (2003) 
15:1 CJWL 1.
39. See e.g. Gibson, supra note 7.
40. See e.g. Andrews, supra note 11 at para 64, Wilson J.
41. My criticism of the SCC as “formalist” in this context is thus largely in the mode, or spirit, of 
immanent critique, rather than any independent idea about the most desirable level of abstraction 
versus specifi city, or generality versus attention to context, in constitutional reasoning.
42. In addition to these three understandings, scholars have also advanced a number of further 
distinctive approaches to the scope of s 15(1). See e.g. Hugh Collins, “Discrimination, 
Equality and Social Inclusion” (2003) 66 Mod L Rev 16 (for a theory based on social 
exclusion); Donna Greschner, “Th e Purpose of Canadian Equality Rights” (2002) 6:2 
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When he endorsed a three-stage approach to discrimination under 
subsection 15(1) in Andrews, Justice McIntyre recognized the centrality of 
questions of “stereotyping” and “historical disadvantage” or “prejudice.”43 
Justice Wilson, in her concurring judgment, gave even greater emphasis to 
concerns about historical disadvantage, or subordination, suggesting that a 
key purpose of section 15 was to ensure that in drawing distinctions between 
individuals, governments did not “bring about or reinforce the disadvantage 
of certain groups.”44
When it affi  rmed and refi ned this three-stage approach in Law,45 the SCC 
explicitly emphasized concerns about both stereotyping and subordination.46 
An “important, but not exclusive” purpose of subsection 15(1), the SCC 
suggested, is “the protection of individuals and groups who are vulnerable, 
disadvantaged, or members of ‘discrete and insular minorities,’” or “a guarantee 
against the evil of [group-based] oppression.”47 Th e SCC also emphasized, 
however, that subsection 15(1) protects individuals, not just groups, from 
“stereotyping, or political or social prejudice.”48 Human dignity, it suggested, 
is a value that underpins both these commitments, as well as the Charter 
guarantee of equality more generally. Th e idea of human dignity entails a 
society in which “all persons enjoy equal recognition … as members of Canadian 
society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration”; 
Section 15 prohibits both “unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circum-
stances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits” of individuals, 
and also prohibits distinctions that mean that individuals or groups are “marginalized, 
ignored, or devalued.”49
Rev Const Stud 291 (for a theory based on social diversity); Rahool Parkash Agarwal, “An 
Autonomy-based Approach to Subsection 15(1) of the Charter” (2006) 12:1 Rev Const Stud 
83 (for a theory based on autonomy); Moreau, supra note 37 (for a theory based on norms of 
fair treatment).
43. Supra note 11 at paras 41-43, citing Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Canada 
(Attorney General), 34 DLR (4th) 584 at para 16, 78 NR 30 (FCA).
44. Andrews, ibid at para 5.
45. See e.g. Emily Grabham, “Law v Canada: New Directions for Equality under the Canadian 
Charter?” (2002) 22:4 Oxford J Legal Stud 641.
46. Supra note 31 at para 64, Iacobucci J.
47. Ibid at paras 68, 42, Iacobucci J.
48. Ibid at para 51, Iacobucci J.
49. Ibid at para 53, Iacobucci J. See e.g. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 24 (for further development 
of the dignity-based vision of s 15(1)).
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In R v Kapp, the SCC once again refi ned this test so as to reduce the role 
played by the four-stage contextual analysis developed in Law, and Law’s 
emphasis on human dignity as a freestanding test for discrimination. 50 However, 
in doing so, the SCC again affi  rmed the idea of discrimination as involving either 
the perpetuation of “disadvantage” or “stereotyping” and the relevance of human 
dignity as a value underpinning these commitments.51
Increasingly, however, the SCC has moved towards a test of immutability 
or constructive immutability for determining whether particular grounds are 
analogous for subsection 15(1) purposes—a test that has little clear connection 
to any of these three underlying understandings of equality.
Initially, in Andrews, the question of immutability was only one of several 
factors considered by Justice La Forest in determining whether citizenship, or 
non-citizen status, was analogous for the purposes of subsection 15(1).52 His reasons 
also evinced a concern with equality as anti-subordination: “Non-citizens,” he 
suggested, are “an example without parallel of a group who are relatively powerless 
politically, and whose interests are likely to be compromised by legislative 
decisions,” and further, against whom there is a long history of discrimination, 
including in the employment context.53 Justice Wilson in particular went even 
further in stressing a concern about anti-subordination, suggesting that what was 
relevant to the status of citizenship as an analogous ground was that non-citizens 
“are a group lacking in political power and as such vulnerable to having their 
interests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and respect violated.”54
Likewise, in Miron, in recognizing marital status as an analogous ground, 
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) gave limited weight to immutability as a 
relevant criterion, simply noting that it had been suggested that “distinctions 
based on personal and immutable characteristics” are discriminatory “by 
extension” of the logic that “[d]istinctions based on personal characteristics, 
attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will 
rarely escape the charge of discrimination.”55 Far more central to her reasoning 
was a focus on a concern for human dignity in general, and anti-stereotyping in 
50. 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483 [Kapp cited to SCC]. For a discussion, see Sophia Moreau, 
“R v Kapp: New Directions for Section 15” (2008-2009) 40:2 Ottawa L Rev 283.
51. Ibid at paras 16-25, McLachlin CJ & Abella J.
52. Supra note 11 at paras 67-68.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid at para 5.
55. Supra note 14 at para 148, citing Andrews, Sopinka, Cory & Iacobucci JJ concurring.
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particular. Namely, the “unifying principle” behind all prior analogous grounds 
jurisprudence was
the avoidance of stereotypical reasoning and the creation of legal distinctions which 
violate the dignity and freedom of the individual, on the basis of some preconceived 
perception about the attributed characteristics of a group rather than the true capacity, 
worth or circumstances of the individual.56
In Egan, however, several members of the SCC began to shift towards 
a much more exclusive reliance on an immutability test.57 Justice La Forest 
suggested (on behalf of four justices) that the concession by the Attorney 
General that sexual orientation is an analogous ground for the purposes of 
subsection 15(1) was proper because sexual orientation is “a deeply personal 
characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable 
personal costs.” He gave no further explanation for why this test was determinative, 
or for why it took precedence over other factors.58
In Corbière, in 1999, the SCC moved even more clearly to endorse 
immutability—or constructive immutability—as more or less the sole 
determinant of whether a ground is analogous for the purposes of subsection 
15(1). Th is paralleled a broader shift by the SCC in Law toward a more 
tightly structured, unifi ed approach to subsection 15(1).59 Th us, the SCC 
suggested in Corbière that what the enumerated grounds have in common is 
that they “often serve as the basis for stereotypical decisions made not on the 
basis of merit but on the basis of a personal characteristic that is immutable 
or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal identity;” on this basis, 
the SCC held that “the thrust of identifi cation of analogous grounds” is that 
they are “based on characteristics that we cannot change or that the government 
56. Ibid at para 149, 496–97 McLachlin J (Sopinka, Cory & Iacobucci JJ concurring).
57. But see Egan, supra note 18 at paras 150-59, 171, Cory & Iacobucci JJ (continuing to 
apply a more multi-factor, substantive test, with a clear focus on the underlying question of 
whether a group claiming analogous ground status had “suff ered discrimination arising from 
stereotyping, historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social prejudice”).
58. Ibid at para 5. See also Vriend, supra note 21 at para 90, Cory & Iacobucci JJ (citing Egan 
and affi  rming this fi nding, the SCC again gave prominence to immutability as one of the key 
factors to be considered). 
59. For the connection between a synthetic approach and a more structured, analytic approach 
in this context, see e.g. Martha C Nussbaum, “Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: 
‘Perception’ against Lofty Formalism” (2007) 121:1 Harvard L Rev 4 (criticizing certain 
aspects of the US Supreme Court’s approach as “lofty” and formalist). See also Majury, supra 
note 37 (criticizing certain aspects of the SCC’s early equality jurisprudence for insuffi  cient 
attention to context and substantive notions of equality).
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has no legitimate interest in expecting us to change to receive equal treatment 
under the law.”60
Th e SCC, however, did not explain what, if any, connection it saw between 
this criterion of immutability, or constructive immutability, and the more 
substantive values underpinning subsection 15(1).61 Th ere is, this article argues, 
at best only a very weak, indirect connection between such a test and the three 
understandings of equality endorsed by the SCC in the application of the other 
limbs of subsection 15(1).62 
From an anti-stereotyping perspective, for example, the most reliable 
indicator of suspect decision making will be the reliance on individual 
characteristics that have no (presumptive) moral or practical relevance. Th is was 
the vision of analogous grounds endorsed by Justice Gonthier, on behalf of four 
justices, in Miron; the key purpose of subsection 15(1), Justice Gonthier suggested, 
was to prevent stereotyping, or reliance on irrelevant distinctions, by the government.63 
Th is, for Justice Gonthier, meant that “[r]elevancy is also at the heart of the 
identifi cation of an analogous ground.”64
In most cases, immutability will also be a poor proxy for moral or practical 
relevance of this kind. Age, for example, while always changing, is also a morally 
relevant or legitimate basis on which the government may draw certain distinctions, 
including distinctions about the degree to which individuals can exercise informed 
60. Supra note 5 at para 13, McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.
61. See e.g. ibid at para 13, McLachlin and Bastarache JJ (suggesting some connection between 
the immutability test and all three understandings of equality, or that immutable personal 
characteristics are often the basis of “stereotypical” or “illegitimate and demeaning proxies 
for merit-based decision making,” or that concerns about historical disadvantage, or political 
powerlessness “could also be seen to fl ow from the central concept of immutability,” but 
providing no further explanation for how, or why, this is the case).
62. Perhaps the most promising defence of such a criterion is that it helps to direct attention 
to individual choice or autonomy as important values underpinning the Charter. See e.g. 
Leckey, supra note 8; Agarwal, supra note 42 (on the connection between autonomy and an 
immutability test and on the importance of autonomy to the interpretation of s 15(1) in 
general). Autonomy, however, has not been the explicit focus of the SCC’s own account of s 
15(1), and has an uneasy fi t with the SCC’s approach to ideas of constructive immutability. 
See Leckey, supra note 8 at 450-51. Autonomy is also a value that may not necessarily always 
be best enforced via a commitment to non-discrimination, rather than to liberty of the 
person more directly. See Avigail Eisenberg, “Rights in the Age of Identity Politics” (2013) 
50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 609 (another potential justifi cation is that immutability can help 
focus attention on the relationship between individual and group identity); Richard Moon, 
“Government Support for Religious Practice” in Richard Moon, ed, Law and Religious 
Pluralism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 217. 
63. Supra note 14 at paras 23-32.
64. Ibid at para 25.
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consent, make informed personal or public decisions, or be required to engage 
in certain compulsory activities (such as compulsory education or vision and 
hearing testing). Likewise, a criminal record is something that is generally impos-
sible to change, once obtained, but a legitimate basis on which governments may 
make certain distinctions, such as those relating to access to certain kinds of jobs 
or information. Marital status or citizenship, on the other hand, are often at least 
somewhat “mutable” or open to change, or control, by individuals.65 Yet they are also 
morally irrelevant for most government purposes, outside the context of immigration 
law or the regulation of the rights and obligations of marriage itself.66
Th e immutability of a characteristic will tend to be closely linked to questions 
of moral and practical relevance in only a relatively small subset of cases, where 
it is presumptively legitimate for the government to draw certain distinctions in 
order to regulate individual conduct. Yet the distinction in question is in fact 
illegitimate because of an individual’s lack of control over that conduct. In the 
United States, the canonical example of this kind of case is Plyler v Doe,67 which 
concerned the rights of undocumented immigrant children. Th e fact that the 
relevant alien children could aff ect “neither their parents’ conduct nor their 
own status” was a central reason for the Court’s decision that it violated the 
Equal Protection Clause for Texas to exclude them from access to its public 
schools, notwithstanding the Court’s finding that it was legitimate for the 
state to attempt to deter illegal immigration by denying certain benefi ts to 
undocumented aliens.68
From an anti-subordination perspective, in turn, the most important 
indicator of suspect decision making by the government will be that it targets a 
group subject to historical prejudice, exclusion, or disadvantage. In most cases, 
identifying such disadvantage is best done directly, by focusing on the actual history 
of disadvantage experienced by a particular group or sub-group of citizens, and 
not on abstract criteria (whether immutability, or some other criterion) about the 
defi ning characteristics of the group. While there are certainly structural factors that 
contribute to systemic disadvantage, including political powerlessness,69 there is 
65. Ibid at para 25 (signifi cant emphasis was placed on this argument by the defendants).
66. Cf. ibid at paras 26-27, Gonthier J.
67. 457 US 202, 102 S Ct 2382 (1982) [Plyler cited to US].
68. Ibid at 238. Th e US Supreme Court also stressed the danger of excluding children from 
schooling, and thereby creating a “discrete underclass” of future citizens (ibid at 234). Th e 
plurality also raised some questions about the extent to which it was legitimate to deter 
entry, while also encouraging and tolerating the presence of undocumented aliens in certain 
respects as a source of cheap labour (ibid at 218-19).
69. See Andrews, supra note 11 at para 68.
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often little logic to the particular groups in a society who experience the most 
acute disadvantage.
Where such a backward-looking approach is not possible because, for 
example, the concern is about creating newly disadvantaged groups, it is also 
far from clear how, or why, immutability (as opposed to, say, the centrality 
or visibility of a characteristic) is a good predictor of subordination. Where a 
government treats a particular group adversely, the most critical question, from 
an anti-subordination perspective, will be whether the relevant form of adverse 
treatment is either likely to lead to, or be correlated with, further adverse 
treatment by other government actors or private individuals.
One factor that will aff ect the answer to this question will be whether the 
particular adverse treatment relates to a person’s status, rather than conduct, and 
thus sends a clear message of disrespect or disregard for a particular group as 
less worthy of full human dignity. Another factor, as Justice Wilson noted in 
Andrews and Turpin, will be whether the relevant group lacks eff ective legal and 
political power, and thus cannot obtain eff ective protection against such adverse 
treatment.70 Beyond this, when it comes to individual characteristics, the most 
relevant question would seem to be whether a particular ground of adverse 
treatment is visible to others, either as an individual characteristic or group 
identity, and thus easily targeted as a basis of adverse treatment. If so, the ground 
is so “central,” or defi ning, for individuals as part of their individual or group 
identity that they are likely to interact frequently with others on the same basis 
that has attracted disadvantage.71
Consider, for instance, the adverse government treatment of three groups: 
waitresses, sex workers, and women generally. Waitresses, in most contexts, 
seem unlikely to be systematically disadvantaged, whereas women, as a class, 
have experienced a long history of social, economic, and political disadvantage. 
Sex workers, in turn, arguably fall somewhere in the middle. Th e most compelling 
explanation for this, however, is not that it is relatively easy to stop being a 
waitress (and become, say, a sales assistant), signifi cantly harder to leave the sex 
industry (because of a lack of relevant marketable skills and coercion within the 
sex industry), and almost impossible to stop being female for those who identify 
as such (except at “unacceptable personal cost”). In a society committed to 
70. Andrews, supra note 11 at para 5; Turpin, supra note 33 at para 47. Th is, as Justice Wilson 
notes, is also one reason why in the United States, even though the label is not wholly 
accurate, suspect or quasi-suspect classes are often referred to as “discrete and insular 
minorities.” See Andrews, supra note 11 at para 6.
71. Cf. Sadurski, supra note 7.
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equality, we do not generally think that the victims of adverse treatment should 
be told to “escape” such treatment by changing their attributes, or status, as opposed 
to conduct. Rather, it is that when the government treats waitresses poorly (by, 
for example, allowing them to be paid a lower wage or providing them with 
fewer workplace protections), we do not generally think that this will lead to, or 
be correlated with, systematic mistreatment of waitresses outside the workplace. 
Waitresses are not generally identifi ed by others, or themselves, by their 
occupation in non-work related contexts. As voters, they have a real chance of 
obtaining support from others with similar workplace conditions and experiences 
(for example via “Unite Here!,” the umbrella trade union for hospitality, airport, 
laundry, food service, gaming, manufacturing, and textile workers).72 Sex workers, 
in contrast, are often labelled or defi ned by others in a range of other contexts by 
reference to their working identity; and, depending on the legal status of their 
work, may have much greater diffi  culty forming a successful political coalition. It 
is more likely still that if waitresses or sex workers experience adverse treatment 
as women (or more specifi cally, poor women, immigrant women, or women of 
colour), this adverse treatment will turn out to carry over into all aspects of their 
life. Th is treatment will be truly systemic, by tracking a highly visible and for 
many, defi ning, individual characteristic and by relying far more strongly on 
individual status, rather than conduct, as the basis of adverse treatment.
Th e actual or constructive immutability of an individual characteristic will, 
at best, be only tangentially relevant to these criteria of political power, visibility, or 
centrality. Distinctions based on truly immutable characteristics may be more 
likely to track a person’s status, rather than conduct, or to be based on visible personal 
characteristics. Th e immutability test, however, also encompasses a range of 
“constructively immutable” characteristics (such as citizenship, marital status, 
and sexual orientation) where there is a much blurrier line between conduct, 
choice, and status, and where there is little real connection to visibility.73 Similarly, 
truly immutable characteristics may or may not be “central” or defi ning for particular 
individuals. Often, it is the choice to identify oneself in terms of particular 
personal characteristics (such as sex, religion, or sexual orientation) that makes 
the particular characteristic defi ning, and not the fact that the characteristic is 
unalterable or given.74
72. Online: <http://www.uniteherecanada.org>.
73. Compare Leckey, supra note 8.
74. Cf. Sadurski, supra note 7 (for statements of leading women and African-Americans 
downplaying gender or race as defi ning characteristics).
(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL654
From a human dignity perspective, there is again a limited connection 
between those grounds of distinction that are most fraught and those characteristics of 
an individual that are truly immutable. Government action based on individual 
characteristics that are generally morally or practically irrelevant will certainly 
raise concerns from a dignity-based perspective. Distinctions that track 
characteristics of a highly personal, or defi ning, nature will also tend to be more 
problematic than those based on less central or defi ning aspects of individual 
identity, particularly where those distinctions involve adverse treatment. True 
immutability, however, is neither a necessary nor a suffi  cient condition for either 
the irrelevancy or personal nature of a characteristic. “Constructive immutability” 
is also a test that has little factual connection in this context to ideas about irrelevance 
or centrality: its connection depends on ideas about fairness and individual 
autonomy and dignity, which are in no way advanced or made easier to apply by 
invocation of the idea of immutability itself.75
Th e historical disadvantage of particular groups may also be relevant, in some 
cases, under a human dignity-based approach. Where particular characteristics have 
attracted systematic adverse treatment in the past, distinctions based on them are 
certainly more likely to feel threatening to individuals and their sense of being 
aff orded equal concern and respect in the present. Likewise, previous adverse 
treatment may give certain groups a special claim to respect and accommodation 
as part of true respect for their collective human dignity.76 Again, however, such 
concerns will have little to do with the immutability of the characteristics that 
defi ne a particular group, since it is the sense of insult or psychological injury that 
is critical to the violation of human dignity in both contexts, not the inability 
to fl ee from past or ongoing disadvantage because of lack of control over, or the 
immutability of, characteristics.
In several cases, this gap between the substantive equality values identifi ed by 
the SCC in the context of subsection 15(1) and the criterion of immutability has 
led lower courts to take a surprisingly narrow approach to claims of inequality 
based on concepts of economic disadvantage or subordination.77 Prior to Corbière, 
75. See ibid (for an extremely eloquent and more extensive version of this argument in a more 
general context).
76. Cf. e.g. Holocaust Denial Case, 90 BVerfGE 241, 1994 NJW 1779 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany) 
(noting that for German Jews “[i]t is part of their personal self-image that they are seen as 
attached to a group of persons marked out by their fate, against which group there exists a 
special moral responsibility on the part of everyone else and which is a part of their dignity”).
77. For scholarly arguments in favour of the importance of structural, or systemic, disadvantage 
as a touchstone for the scope of s 15(1), see e.g. Hart Schwartz, “Making Sense of Section 
15 of the Charter” (2011) 29:2 NJCL 201; Ian Savage, “Systemic Discrimination and 
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in Sparks v Dartmouth/Halifax County Regional Housing Authority, 78 for example, 
provincial courts took a broad approach to claims of discrimination based on 
poverty or income, as at least one intersecting ground of discrimination under 
subsection 15(1). In Sparks, a public housing tenant who was a black, poor, single 
mother challenged provisions denying her the same protections for security 
of tenure available to tenants in privately owned housing. In upholding this 
claim, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal gave extensive attention to historical 
disadvantage suff ered both by public housing tenants generally and by particular 
subgroups of public housing tenants. Poverty for single mothers, it suggested, 
was “no less a personal characteristic … than non-citizenship was in Andrews.”79 
On this basis, the court concluded that public housing tenants were a group 
analogous to those identifi ed in subsection 15(1).
Since Corbière, in contrast, provincial courts have applied a far more 
mechanical test, asking whether the poor are “a discrete and insular group defi ned 
by a common personal characteristic ,”80 whether poverty as a condition is in any 
way alterable by individuals, whether “fi nancial circumstances may change” such 
that “individuals may enter and leave poverty,” and whether the government has 
a legitimate interest in encouraging individuals to exit from poverty. 81 By answering 
these questions in the negative, provincial courts have given little meaningful 
scrutiny to the potential for various laws to draw distinctions that both track 
and entrench pre-existing economic disadvantage (for example, laws prohibiting 
certain forms of public solicitation of money or laws imposing uniform tariff s for 
energy consumption).82
Section 15 of the Charter” (1985-1986) 50:1 Sask L Rev 141. For this kind of argument in 
the context of socioeconomic disadvantage specifi cally, see Bruce Porter, “Twenty Years of 
Equality Rights: Reclaiming Expectation” (2005) 23:1 Windsor YB of Access Just 145.
78. (1993), 119 NSR (2d) 91, 101 DLR (4th) 224 (CA) [Sparks cited to NSR].
79. Ibid at para 32.
80. See e.g. R v Banks (2007) 84 OR (3d) 1 at para 104, 275 DLR (4th) 640 (CA) [Banks] 
[emphasis added].
81. See e.g. Boulter v Nova Scotia Power Inc (2009), 275 NSR (2d) 214 at para 42 [Boulter] 
(noting that “a clinging web” is “not an indelible trait like race, national or ethnic origin, 
color, gender or age” because “fi nancial circumstances may change, and individuals may enter 
and leave poverty or gain or lose resources”).
82. See the facts in Banks, supra note 80; ibid. Th ere is, of course, an important question as to 
whether, in a market economy, courts are well-equipped to distinguish “legitimate” from 
illegitimate discrimination based on poverty, or whether poverty is an analogous ground that 
“fi ts” with the general absence of socioeconomic rights in the Charter. Th ere does, however, 
seem to be at least some potential scope for the SCC and lower courts to have gone further in 
applying scrutiny to such distinctions. See e.g. Margot Young, “Social Justice and the Charter: 
Comparison and Choice” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 669 (expressing similar concerns). 
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III. WHY THE COMBINATION? THE IMPORTANCE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL BASELINES
What, then, accounts for this surprising combination of generous interpretation 
and increasing formalism on the part of the SCC within the same body of equality 
jurisprudence? One potential answer, this Part suggests, can be found in the 
number and scope of the analogical baselines in subsection 15(1), and how the 
SCC has approached their relationship to each other.83
A. SUBSECTION 15(1) AND HETEROGENEOUS GROUNDS
From the perspective of diff erent theories of equality, subsection 15(1) contains 
a great deal of heterogeneity in the grounds it lists as enumerated grounds of 
discrimination. 
From an anti-stereotyping perspective, for example, many of the grounds 
listed in subsection 15(1) touch on personal characteristics that are almost never 
morally or practically relevant for government action, except possibly in a remedial 
context. Others involve characteristics that may sometimes be relevant, from a 
practical perspective, but which in general society regards as having limited moral 
relevance for the opportunities and rewards open to individuals. Others, however, 
involve characteristics with a far closer relationship to individuals’ actual needs 
and capacities, 84 and thus with a far less natural relationship to a theory of “moral 
and practical irrelevance.”85
One way in which courts might have done so would have been to focus, as the Court of 
Appeal did in Sparks, on the intersection between poverty and other prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. See supra note 78. I am indebted to Jennifer Nedelsky for this suggestion.
83. Another explanation, of course, is that the analogous grounds requirement under s 15(1) 
actually does no work in the SCC’s analysis, and is simply equivalent to a conclusion that the 
SCC does, or does not, regard particular discrimination as justifi ed. See e.g. Gibson, supra 
note 7. Th is would also explain why the SCC has been somewhat inconsistent over time in 
its approach to the analogous grounds question, though not necessarily why there has been 
convergence toward a more consistently formalist test, even in the face of a quite generous 
application of that test, as in Corbière. Another potential explanation might be changes in 
the composition of the SCC. See e.g. Rosalind Dixon, “Weak-form Judicial Review and 
American Exceptionalism”(2012) 32:2 Oxford J Legal Stud 487. Such changes, however, do 
not seem to off er a suffi  cient explanation in the circumstances, given the presence of at least 
fi ve of the same justices in cases such as Miron and Corbière.   
84. See e.g. Rosalind Dixon & Martha C Nussbaum, “Children’s Rights and a Capabilities 
Approach: Th e Question of Special Priority” (2012) 97:3 Cornell L Rev 549 [Dixon & 
Nussbaum, “Children’s Rights”].
85. Th is precise issue was in fact raised by feminist groups at the time s 15(1) was drafted in 
the form of a concern that age, as an enumerated ground, could potentially dilute the 
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Consider the diff erences between race, gender, disability, and age as enumerated 
grounds of discrimination in this context. Race, most Canadians agree, is 
almost never morally or practically relevant to government action, except to the 
extent it is part of an attempt to “ameliorate the predicament of a group more 
disadvantaged.”86 Gender is similarly morally and practically irrelevant for most 
purposes, though not necessarily in the context of “real” diff erences between the 
sexes in terms of physical strength, vulnerability to certain forms of sexual violence87 
or certain consequences associated with such violence,88 and medical and other 
needs associated with pregnancy.89 
Disability, on the other hand, will be far more frequently relevant to government 
policy. As the SCC noted in Eaton v Brant County Board of Education,90 it is both 
empirically true and practically relevant for certain purposes (such as who may 
obtain a driver’s license, for example, or be a fi re captain) that “[t]he blind person 
cannot see and the person in a wheelchair needs a ramp.”91 Th us, in most cases, it 
is not “the attribution of stereotypical characteristics” to persons with disabilities 
that is the source of discrimination based on disability. Rather, it is the failure to 
provide appropriate accommodation and support for persons with disabilities, 
based on their “actual characteristics” and needs, that causes restrictions on their 
opportunity for full social and economic inclusion and participation.92 
A person’s age will be similarly relevant to a range of legitimate government 
interests, or objectives, 93 particularly at the very early and later stages of life when 
guarantee of equal opportunity, or anti-stereotyping, for women. See e.g. BL Strayer, “In the 
Beginning…: Th e Origins of Section 15 of the Charter” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 13 at 22. 
Th e response of the drafters of s 15(1), however, was simply to reverse the order of sex and 
age in the list of enumerated grounds found in s 15(1). See Mary Dawson, “Th e Making of 
Section 15 of the Charter” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 25 at 30-31. Th is response, however, 
has had no discernible eff ect on the subsequent interpretation of the provision.
86. Lavoie v Canada, 2002 SCC 23 at para 45, 1 SCR 769, Bastarache J; Kapp, supra note 50 
at 508, McLachlin CJ & Abella J (discussing the scope and purpose of s 15(2)). See also 
discussion in Leckey, supra note 8 at 460-61.
87. See e.g. Weatherall v Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 SCR 872, 105 DLR (4th) 210 
(upholding diff erences in male-to-female, versus female-to-male, searches by prison guards 
on this basis).
88. See e.g. R v Nguyen; R v Hess, [1990] 2 SCR 906, [1990] SCJ No 91 (QL) (upholding a sex-
specifi c prohibition on statutory rape).
89. See e.g. discussion in Miron, supra note 14 at para 30, Gonthier J.
90. [1997] 1 SCR 241, 31 OR (3d) 574 [Eaton cited to SCR].
91. Ibid at para 67, Sopinka J.
92. Ibid.
93. See e.g. McKinney v University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229 at para 88, 2 OR (3d) 319 
[McKinney]. La Forest J notes that
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the government has a legitimate interest in protecting individuals from 
exploitation and mistreatment, and, in the case of children, protecting and 
fostering the capacity for later autonomous and informed adult choice.94
Likewise, from an anti-subordination perspective, subsection 15(1) 
contains grounds that are both completely neutral as regards the experience 
of historical disadvantage, and that are far more asymmetric or specifi cally 
focused on a history of subordination. 95 Th e clearest example of such an 
asymmetric guarantee is the prohibition in subsection 15(1) on discrimination 
based on mental or physical disability. As the SCC noted in Eldridge v British 
Columbia (Attorney General), persons with disabilities have been subjected 
to a long and unfortunate history of “exclusion and marginalization” in the 
workplace and in various other contexts, resulting in persistent social and economic 
disadvantage compared to those conforming to “able-bodied norms.”96 Most 
other enumerated grounds, in contrast, encompass groups that clearly have 
experienced historical prejudice and disadvantage, and groups that have not.97 
there are important diff erences between age discrimination and some of the other grounds 
mentioned in s. 15(1). To begin with there is nothing inherent in most of the specifi ed grounds 
of discrimination, e.g., race, colour, religion, national or ethnic origin, or sex that supports any 
general correlation between those characteristics and ability. But that is not the case with age.
94. Dixon & Nussbaum, “Children’s Rights,” supra note 84.
95. Cf. Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84 at para 31, 4 SCR 429, McLachlin 
CJ [Gosselin] (suggesting that “[m]any of the enumerated grounds correspond to historically 
disadvantaged groups”).
96.  [1997] 3 SCR 624 at para 56, 151 DLR (4th) 577, La Forest J (citing M David Lepofsky, 
“A Report Card on the Charter’s Guarantee of Equality to Persons with Disabilities after 
10 Years – What Progress? What Prospects?” (1997) 7:2 NJCL 263); Statistics Canada, A 
Portrait of Persons with Disabilities (Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, 1995) 
at 46-49; Sandra A Goundry & Yvonne Peters, Litigating for Disability Equality Rights: 
Th e Promises and the Pitfalls (Winnipeg: Canadian Disabilities Rights Council, 1994) at 
5-6. See also CGK Atkins, “A Cripple at a Rich Man’s Gate: A Comparison of Disability, 
Employment and Anti-discrimination Law in the United States and Canada” (2006) 21:2 
Canadian J L & Society 87.
97. Th ere is, of course, always the potential for this to change, or for old hierarchies to not 
simply disappear, but to actually be reversed. Th is, for example, is a concern implicit in 
some affi  rmative action jurisprudence in the US. See e.g. Adarand Constructors Inc v Pena, 
515 US 200 at 239, 115 S Ct 2097 (1995), Scalia J (emphasizing the danger of ideas about 
“debtor” and “creditor” races). Th is potential also often underpins courts’ approaches to 
equality guarantees more generally. See e.g. Pretoria (City of ) v Walker, [1998] 3 B Const LR 
257 at para 47, 2 S Afr LR 363 (Const Ct). Th ere is, nonetheless, an important distinction 
between the symmetry and asymmetry of grounds from a backward-looking perspective. I 
am indebted to Mark Tushnet for pressing me on this point.
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Whiteness, for example, has not, by itself, been a marker of historical dis-
advantage in Canada, whereas being black,98 or Aboriginal,99 has frequently been 
associated with such disadvantage.100 Being male has generally been associated with 
social, political, and economic privilege, rather than disadvantage,101 whereas 
being female has meant the systematic denial of access to political and economic 
power and opportunity,102 disproportionate vulnerability to physical and 
sexual violence,103 and economic deprivation.104 Whereas being young (at least 
for adults) has often meant access to social and economic opportunity,105 old 
age has often been associated with social stigma, and social and economic 
marginalization.106 Similarly, dominant faith groups within mainstream 
Christian churches have tended to enjoy significant social and government 
support, whereas various religious minorities, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses 107 and 
Jewish Canadians, have been the object of widespread societal prejudice and, 
in some cases, legally sanctioned disadvantage and marginalization.108 Roman 
Catholics have also experienced signifi cant social prejudice and hatred (while enjoying 
certain constitutionally sanctioned forms of support in other contexts),109 as have 
98. See e.g. Sparks, supra note 78.
99. See Corbière, supra note 5 at paras 18-19, McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.
100. See e.g. J Helen Beck, Jeff rey G Reitz & Nan Weiner, “Addressing Systemic Racial 
Discrimination in Employment: Th e Health Canada Case and Implications of Legislative 
Change” (2002) 28:3 Can Pub Pol’y 373. See also Julie Jai & Joseph Cheng, “Th e Invisibility 
of Race in Section 15: Why Section 15 of the Charter Has Not Done More to Promote 
Racial Equality” (2006) 5:1 JL & Equality 125.
101. Trociuk v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 34 at para 20, 1 SCR 835.
102. See e.g. Edwards v Canada (Attorney General), [1928] SCR 276, 4 DLR 98.
103. See e.g. R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme, [1991] 2 SCR 577, 4 OR (3d) 383, L’Heureux-Dubé & 
Gonthier JJ (dissenting).
104. See e.g. Sparks, supra note 78; Anderson, supra note 24 at 43. See more generally Statistics 
Canada, Women in Canada: A Gender-Based Statistical Report, 5th ed (Ottawa: Minister of 
Industry, 2006).
105. See e.g. Law, supra note 31 at para 101, Iacobucci J; Gosselin, supra note 95 at paras 32-33, 
McLachlin CJ (“[y]oung people do not have a similar history of being undervalued … as a general 
matter … young adults as a class simply do not seem especially vulnerable or undervalued”).
106. See e.g. McKinney, supra note 93 at 431-32, L’Heureux-Dubé J (discussion of the potentially 
marginalizing eff ect of retirement).
107. See e.g. Saumur v Quebec (City), [1953] 2 SCR 299, 4 DLR 641 [Saumar cited to SCR]; 
Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689 [Roncarelli cited to SCR], as discussed 
in Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 SCR 609 at 661, 30 OR (3d) 642, L’Heureux-Dubé J (dissenting).
108. See e.g. Saumar, supra note 107; Roncarelli, supra note 107.
109. See e.g. David Matas, “Waldman v Canada: Religious Discrimination in the Constitution” 
(2000) 11:3 Const Forum Const 99.
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members of certain South Asian religions, who have likewise experienced signifi cant 
social prejudice and hatred.110
B. MULTI-PRONGED VS. SYNTHETIC APPROACHES TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
BASELINES
Heterogeneity of this kind in a constitution’s baseline categories can prompt 
courts to respond quite diff erently to new constitutional claims, depending on 
how judges approach the task of comparing new and existing constitutional 
categories.
One approach is to ask whether the new category has any similarity with one 
or more of the existing baseline constitutional categories. Under this “direct” or 
“multi-pronged” approach, the greater the number and heterogeneity of baseline 
categories, the more likely that a court will fi nd such similarity. Th e greater the 
diversity of features that can be identifi ed among constitutional baselines, the 
more likely it is that any new constitutional category will share one or more of 
those features.
A good example of this, from a comparative perspective, is the approach 
of the Delhi High Court and the legal committee of the House of Lords to the 
recognition of sexual orientation as an “analogous” ground for the purposes of 
Articles 15 and 16 of the Indian Constitution,111 and Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights,112 respectively. In both India and the UK, the 
constitutional guarantee of equality, or non-discrimination, contains a number of 
(at least somewhat) diverse enumerated grounds, but is otherwise much narrower 
than in Canada.113 Yet it has been relatively easy for plaintiff s in both countries 
to persuade the relevant courts to apply heightened scrutiny to distinctions based 
110. Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Visible Minorities in Canadian Society, 
Equality Now! (March 1984) at 69 (Chair: Bob Daudlin), as discussed in R v Keegstra,  [1990] 
3 SCR 697 at para 59, 3 CRR (2d) 193.
111. India Const, 1950.
112. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 
213 UNTS 221 at 223, Eur TS 5 [Convention].
113. In contrast to the four distinct guarantees of equality under s 15(1) of the Charter, s 15(1) 
of the Indian Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of “religion, race, caste, 
sex, [and] place of birth.” Section 16(1) guarantees equality of opportunity and prohibits 
discrimination on those grounds; s 16(2) prohibits discrimination on the basis of “descent” 
and “residence,” but only in respect of public employment. In the UK, art 14 of the European 
Convention simply provides a guarantee of non-discrimination in respect of the enjoyment 
of other rights, and not an independent guarantee of equality. For discussion, see e.g. Rory 
O’Connell, “Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Article 14 and the Right to Non-discrimination 
in the ECHR” (2009) 29:2 LS 211.
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on sexual orientation by relying on a multi-pronged approach to the question of 
analogous grounds.
In Naz Foundation v Government of DCT of Delhi, 114 for example, the Delhi 
High Court held that certain provisions of the Indian Criminal Code115 prohibiting 
“unnatural sexual acts,” such as anal intercourse between men violated the guarantee 
of equality in Article 15 of the Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court relied strongly on an analogy between sex and sexual orientation, 
first noting cases that found discrimination based on sexual orientation to be 
equivalent to sex-based discrimination,116 and then concluding (without further 
analysis) that “sexual orientation is a ground analogous to sex.”117
Similarly, in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, 118 the House of Lords held that 
it was incompatible with Article 8 (the right to family life) and Article 14 
of the Convention for the UK Parliament to extend certain statutory tenancy 
rights to opposite but not to same-sex couples on the death of a partner. Lord 
Nicholls, in reaching this decision, reasoned simply that laws “must not draw a 
distinction on grounds such as sex or sexual orientation without good reason.”119 
Baroness Hale, in turn, drew a direct analogy between discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and discrimination based on sex or race. In her view, these 
two express grounds of discrimination were united by “stereotypical assumptions 
… which had nothing to do with the qualities of the individual involved,” and 
which were equally applicable to discrimination against gay and lesbian people, 
or same-sex relationships.120
An alternative approach, however, is for courts to attempt fi rst to identify a 
common thread or denominator behind existing constitutional categories and 
only then to proceed to compare new (claimed) constitutional categories with a 
constitution’s existing baselines. Such an approach has the attraction for courts 
114. (2009) 160 DLT 277 at para 1, [2009] WP(C) No.7455/2001 (H Ct Delhi) [Naz 
Foundation] (currently subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court of India). For commentary, 
see Pritam Baruah, “Logic and Coherence in Naz Foundation: Th e Arguments of Non-
Discrimination, Privacy and Dignity” (2009) 2:3 NUJS L Rev 505; Vikram Raghavan, 
“Navigating the Noteworthy and Nebulous in Naz Foundation” (2009) 2 NUJS L Rev 397.
115. RSC 1985, c C-46.
116. Naz Foundation, supra note 114 at para 100, citing Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee Under the Optional Protocol, HRC Dec 488/1992, UNHRCOR, 50th Sess, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, (1994) 133 at 139-40 (referring to Toonen v Australia).
117. Naz Foundation, supra note 114 at para 104.
118. [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557, (UK) [Ghaidan cited to UKHL].
119. Ibid at para 6 [emphasis added] (the opinion was joined by  Lord Steyn, Lord Rodger & 
Baroness Hale).
120. Ibid at paras 130-32.
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of being more systematic and consistent in its formal application than a direct 
or multi-pronged approach. It thus appeals understandably to judges as part of 
an attempt to develop an analytically rigorous and predictable body of equality 
jurisprudence.121
 Such an approach, however, produces a diff erent response by courts to the 
heterogeneous grounds. Rather than leading to a broader, more permissive approach 
to the recognition of new constitutional grounds as analogous, it tends to lead to 
more abstract reasoning by courts about the test for analogous grounds.  
Th e more numerous and diverse the existing constitutional categories, the 
more diffi  cult it will be for courts, under such an approach, to fi nd commonality 
among those grounds in their scope, signifi cance, or underlying purpose. And 
thus the more likely it will be that courts will need to resort to high levels of 
abstraction in order to identify even some form of internal coherence or 
common denominator amongst them. Some degree of abstraction in constitutional 
reasoning may be desirable (and unavoidable), to generate greater judicial impartiality 
or neutrality.122 Abstraction of this kind is, however, likely to lead courts signifi cantly 
beyond that level, instead involving a form of “lofty” reasoning with little or no 
connection to underlying constitutional commitments or concerns.123
Support for this understanding can be found in the approach of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa to the test for analogousness under section 
8(2) of the 1993 South African Constitution124 and under section 9(3) of the 1996 
Constitution.125 Section 8(2) of the 1993 Constitution contained a prohibition 
against unfair discrimination on 13 distinct enumerated grounds: race, gender, 
sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, and language. Like subsection 15(1) of the Charter, 
this list also included characteristics, or grounds, with quite diff erent attributes, 
relevance, and degrees of symmetry. 126 In developing a test for analogousness 
121. See Leckey, supra note 8 (for the potential relevance of this in the Canadian context).
122. Compare e.g. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) 
(on the relationship between abstraction and values of impartiality in constitutional decision 
making); Adrian Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007) (providing similar arguments about the relationship 
between “veil rules” and impartiality values). I am indebted to Wojciech Sadurski for this point. 
123. See the sources cited at supra note 59.
124. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, No 200 of 1993.
125. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, No 108 of 1996.
126. See e.g. Harksen v Lane NO and Others (1997), [1998] 1 SA 300 at para 49, (CCT9/97) 
[1997] ZACC 12, Goldstone J (S Afr Const Ct) [Harksen] (“[i]n some cases they relate to 
immutable biological attributes or characteristics, in some to the associational life of humans, 
in some to the intellectual, expressive and religious dimensions of humanity and in some 
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under section 8(2), the Constitutional Court also ultimately attempted to 
develop a common denominator approach to “unfairness,” similar to that of the 
SCC in Corbière.127 
In Prinsloo, for example, the Constitutional Court suggested that what 
underpinned unfair discrimination, and thus the defi nition of an analogous 
ground for the purposes of section 8(2), was “treating persons diff erently in a way 
which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently 
equal in dignity.”128 Similarly, in Harksen, it held that the key test was whether 
discrimination was based on “attributes or characteristics which have the potential 
to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to aff ect them 
adversely in a comparably serious manner.”129 On their own, such criteria are 
so broad and abstract130 as to provide almost no guidance to subsequent judges 
regarding whether particular grounds are analogous131 for the purposes either of 
cases to a combination of one or more of these features”).
127. Prinsloo v Van der Linde, [1997] ZACC 5 at para 31, (6) B Const LR 759 (S Afr Const Ct) 
[Prinsloo] (“[a]lthough one thinks in the fi rst instance of discrimination on the grounds of 
race and ethnic origin one should never lose sight in any historical evaluation of other forms 
of discrimination … [and thus unfair discrimination] in the context of section 8 as a whole” 
[emphasis added]).
128. Ibid at para 31.
129. Harksen, supra note 126 at para 49. At the same time, the Constitutional Court also noted 
that “the temptation to force [the diff erent enumerated grounds] into neatly self-contained 
categories should be resisted” (at para 47).
130. It should be noted that the Constitutional Court has not necessarily closely followed this test 
in subsequent cases involving the question of analogous grounds, but rather engaged in a far 
more wide-ranging inquiry, involving greater focus on more substantive understandings of 
equality. See e.g. Hoff man v South African Airways, [2000] ZACC 17 at para 28, (11) B Const 
LR 1235, (S Afr Const Ct) (identifying HIV status as an analogous ground for the purposes 
of section 9(3), after considering the history of “systemic disadvantage and discrimination,” 
“stigm[a]” and “marginali[zation]” experienced by those living with HIV, and their social 
and political “vulnerability”); Khosa v Minister of Social Development, [2004] ZACC 11 at 
para 71, (6) B Const LR 569, (S Afr Const Ct) [Khosa] (holding that permanent resident 
status was an analogous ground in large part because of permanent residents’ lack of “political 
muscle,” and the fact that “in the South African context individuals were deprived of rights 
or benefi ts ostensibly on the basis of citizenship, but in reality in circumstances where 
citizenship was governed by race”).
131. Th e idea of human dignity certainly has the potential to provide valuable guidance to a court 
in determining the scope of a constitutional guarantee of equality but to do so, it requires a 
great deal more elaboration and development. See e.g. Rory O’Connell, “Th e Role of Dignity 
in Equality Law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa” (2008) 6:2 Intl J Const L 267. One 
such approach to its elaboration or development can be found in the “capabilities approach” 
of Martha Nussbaum. See e.g. Rosalind Dixon & Martha C Nussbaum, “Abortion, Dignity, 
and a Capabilities Approach” in Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez & Tsvi Kahana, eds, 
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section 8(2), or of the largely equivalent provisions in section 9(3) of the 1996 
Constitution.132
Moreover, this diff erence between the multi-pronged and common 
denominator approaches provides at least one plausible explanation for the 
surprising combination of broad and generous interpretation with high 
formalism on the part of the SCC in its analogous grounds jurisprudence because, 
over time, there has been a subtle shift by the SCC in this context from a multi-
pronged to a more synthetic approach.
In some early cases, the SCC and lower courts were quite explicit in their 
willingness to apply a multi-pronged approach to the analogous grounds 
question. Take the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Egan133 in which 
it held, on the basis of a concession by the parties, that sexual orientation is “a 
ground analogous to discrimination based on ‘sex.’”134 In justifying its conclusion, 
the court relied strongly on the connection between discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and sex in the particular case, noting that one of the plaintiff s 
had “been denied a benefi t under the law equal to that to which an opposite sex 
common law spouse is entitled.”135
Similarly, in Miron, Justice McLachlin (as she then was) found that marital 
status is an analogous ground in part by relying on a direct analogy to religion 
as an enumerated ground. Discrimination on the basis of marital status, she 
suggested, could be analogized to discrimination on the ground of religion “to 
the extent that it fi nds its roots and expression in moral disapproval of all sexual 
unions except those sanctioned by church and state.”136 Even more important, 
she suggested that the fact that marital status is at least partially chosen by 
individuals (even if unevenly so by diff erent individuals) need not be a bar to its 
recognition as an analogous ground because “[r]eligion, an enumerated ground, 
is not immutable.”137 
In Andrews, in adopting a range of substantive criteria for analogousness in 
addition to a test of immutability, the SCC also gave implicit eff ect to a multi-
pronged approach. Th e SCC’s emphasis on the notion of a “discrete and insular 
Feminist Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2012) 64.
132. Th e Constitutional Court has affi  rmed the same test under s 9(3) of the Constitution. See e.g. 
Khosa, supra note 130 at para 70.
133. Supra note 18.
134. Ibid at para 3.
135. Ibid.
136. Miron, supra note 14 at para 154.
137. Ibid at para 149.
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minority,” for example, clearly applies to only a subset of the enumerated grounds 
under subsection 15(1), such as certain racial, ethnic, or religious minorities, 
and some non-citizen groups, but not to women138 or the aged.139 Th e focus 
on historical disadvantage by Justice La Forest was also more relevant to certain 
clearly asymmetric, rather than symmetric, grounds.
In Corbière, in contrast, the SCC shifted quite explicitly toward a synthetic 
approach to the analogous grounds question, suggesting that 
what [the enumerated] grounds have in common is the fact that they often serve as 
the basis for stereotypical decisions made not on the basis of merit but on the basis 
of a personal characteristic that is immutable or changeable only at unacceptable 
cost to personal identity.140
IV. CONCLUSION: CANADIAN LESSONS FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND AMENDMENT
In the United States in the last decade, there has been a vibrant debate among consti-
tutional scholars as to the relevance (or irrelevance) of formal amendments to the US 
Constitution and as to the failure of certain proposed amendments, such as the ERA. 
To date, however, this debate has tended to focus almost exclusively on the immediate 
jurisprudential consequences of the success or failure of particular amendments. 
Scholars such as David Strauss have argued that because the US Supreme Court has 
increasingly required “an exceedingly persuasive justifi cation” for all classifi cations 
based on sex, even in the absence of the ERA,141 “it is diffi  cult to identify any respect 
in which constitutional law is diff erent from what it would have been if the ERA had 
been adopted.”142 Others, such as Adrian Vermeule, have responded by arguing that 
it is important to consider the degree to which amendments may alter the probability 
of particular legal outcomes.143 Neither side in the debate has focused on the way in 
which formal constitutional amendments such as the ERA may have had the potential 
to expand the analogical baseline employed by the US Supreme Court in responding to 
new, unrelated claims to constitutional protection or recognition.
138. See Kathleen M Sullivan, “Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality” (2002) 90:3 Cal L Rev 735.
139. See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 55.18ff .
140. Supra note 5 at para 13, McLachlin and Bastarache JJ [emphasis added].
141. See United States v Virginia, [1996] 518 US 515 at 524, 116 S Ct 2264 (SC).
142. David A Strauss, “Th e Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments” (2001) 114:5 Harv L Rev 
1457 at 1476-77.
143. Adrian Vermeule, “Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law” in 
Richard W Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds, Th e Least Examined Branch: Th e Role of Legislatures 
in the Constitutional State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 229.
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Th e lessons of the SCC’s Charter jurisprudence for an American audience, 
in this context, are thus both important and quite simple, namely that the 
number and scope of analogical baselines in a constitution can matter a great 
deal, even if in unpredictable ways. Th is, in turn, suggests that had proposed 
amendments such as the ERA been enacted, they would very likely have had 
real, if also unpredictable, consequences for the US Supreme Court’s approach 
to other equal protection cases, by making gender a distinct analogical baseline 
against which new claims to heightened scrutiny could be measured, rather 
than simply a category itself dependent on an analogy to race. 
Th e most likely consequence of this, as I have argued elsewhere, would 
have been to encourage a greater willingness on the part of the US Supreme 
Court to recognize certain claims to heightened scrutiny, such as those based 
on age, disability, and sexual orientation.144 Another possibility, however, 
is that the US Supreme Court could simply have moved to adopt a quite 
diff erent, even if not necessarily more expansive, approach to the test for 
heightened scrutiny.145
In other countries, the SCC’s approach offers potentially even more 
important and specifi c lessons for constitutional drafters and re-drafters who 
are debating the scope of constitutional rights to equality more generally. 
Many governments in recent years have ostensibly attempted to strengthen 
small “c” constitutional commitments to equality by adopting (or proposing) 
legislation that both expands and unifi es pre-existing legislative prohibitions 
on discrimination.146 The drafters of new constitutions in countries such 
as Kenya have been praised for progressively refi ning the draft of consti-
tutional guarantees of equality so as to provide “additional protection” via 
the recognition of a larger and more diverse list of enumerated grounds of 
discrimination.147
144. Rosalind Dixon, “Amending Constitutional Identity” (2012) 33:5 Cardozo L Rev 1847-58 
(especially 1855) [Dixon, “Constitutional Identity”].
145. In the UK, for example, a synthetic approach to race and gender tended to produce 
a distinctive focus on notions of moral and practical irrelevance as the touchstone for 
analogousness or heightened scrutiny under art 14. See e.g. Ghaidan, supra note 118 at para 
130, Baroness Hale. At present, the US Supreme Court focuses on a far greater range of 
factors it deems implicit in race-based discrimination. See Dixon, “Constitutional Identity,” 
supra note 144.
146. See e.g. Equality Act 2010 (UK), c 15. See also Law Council of Australia, submission to the 
Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Consolidation of Commonwealth Anti-Discrimination 
Laws Discussion Paper (1 February 2012) (for similar proposals in Australia).
147. See e.g. Jim Fitzgerald, “Th e Road to Equality? Th e Right to Equality in Kenya’s New 
Constitution” (2010) 5 Equal Rights Rev 55 at 58.
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Th e lesson of Corbière in this context, however, is that more may not 
always be better—at least within the same constitutional instrument148—if the 
aim is to encourage judges to give broad eff ect to a particular preferred vision of 
equality. Given the kind of synthetic approach adopted by the SCC in Corbière, 
too much internal diversity in a constitution’s baseline categories will tend to 
defl ect attention away from drafters’ substantive underlying understandings or 
purposes in favour of a more abstract, formalist account of what lies behind drafters’ 
constitutional choices. Th is, in turn, can create a serious risk of both over- and 
under-enforcement from the perspective of a constitutional designer seeking to 
achieve a particular vision of equality or constitutionalism more generally.
Take a constitution drafter wishing to encourage courts to give broad 
eff ect to an anti-subordination principle under a constitutional equality guarantee.
One approach for such a drafter would be to attempt to enumerate all those 
grounds of discrimination that could potentially be used by the government to 
undermine the equal standing of groups in society. Another would be to list only 
those grounds that, historically, had been the basis of actual systemic disadvantage for 
particular groups in the society. Th e fi rst approach could be expected to produce 
a long and symmetric list of grounds common to all modern liberal constitutions, 
including race, ethnic origin, colour, tribe, place of origin, gender, sexual 
orientation, birth, primary language, social or economic status, age, disability, 
creed or religion, and political opinion.149 In contrast, the second approach could 
be expected to produce a much shorter, more context-specifi c, asymmetric list 
(such as, in Canada, for instance, one focused on aboriginality; femaleness; new 
immigrant, religious or sexual minority status; poverty; old-age; and disability).  
Th e fi rst approach might thus also, intuitively, be seen as more consistent 
with a broad approach by courts to the enforcement of the drafter’s vision of 
equality. Th is article argues, however, that the lesson of the SCC’s equality 
jurisprudence in this context is that the opposite may in fact be the case: namely, 
that at least within the scope of a single guarantee, it is the second, narrower, and more 
parsimonious approach, rather than the fi rst broader and more comprehensive 
148. One question, which is beyond the scope of this paper to explore, is whether internally 
separating or dividing certain guarantees may help alleviate this problem (by, for example, 
grouping diff erent express constitutional baselines by distinct underlying purpose). 
Subsection 15(1), of course, does not do this and it is clear that mere word ordering will 
be insuffi  cient to achieve this. Separate guarantees, however, arguably adhere to the logic of 
constitutional design curves by showing that particular provisions cannot be too broad in 
coverage without creating dangers of interpretive formalism.
149. Compare e.g. Fiji Islands, Constitution Amendment Act 1997, s 39 (PacLII); Constitution of the 
Republic of Uganda 1995, s 21, online: <www.statehouse.go.ug>.
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approach, that will produce the more consistent enforcement of anti-subordination 
principles by a court. It will do so by reasoning that, in all cases, pays attention to 
those principles, rather than more abstract notions of equality.150 Th is approach 
also seems to conform to a more general principle of constitutional design: after 
some tipping point, increasing breadth or specifi city in constitutional language 
may not always increase long-term control over constitutional outcomes.151 Th e 
reasons for this may vary from one context to the next, and be quite diff erent in 
the context of constitutional analogical baselines than in most other contexts. 
Th e phenomenon, however, seems quite widespread, and thus, what seems like 
an anomaly in the SCC’s analogical grounds jurisprudence may in fact be part 
of a much broader pattern of a distinctly non-linear, inverted “U-shaped” 
relationship between specifi c constitutional design choices and courts’ approach 
to constitutional interpretation.152
For this reason alone, if no other, the SCC’s analogous grounds jurisprudence 
also seems worthy of further attention and study by comparative constitutional 
lawyers in the years to come.
150. One possibility, for example, is that a constitutional equality clause could be internally 
divided to refl ect commitments to anti-subordination, anti-stereotyping, and rule of law or 
formal individual equality values. See e.g. s 9(1) of the Constitution of South Africa (clearly 
delineating formal rule of law and more substantive equality concerns). Such a vision might 
also in some ways help relieve pressure on a court, under an anti-subordination guarantee, to 
dilute the substantive focus of that guarantee in order to accommodate meritorious claims of 
this latter kind.     
151. One of the contexts in which this seems true is in the allocation of general, versus specifi c, 
grants of power to one or other level of government in a federal system. See e.g. Rosalind 
Dixon, “Constitutional Design Curves” (2012) [working paper, on fi le with author] [Dixon, 
“Constitutional Design”] (discussing Art I of the US Constitution versus s 51 of the Australian 
Constitution in this context). I also thank Jamie Cameron for the suggestion that ss 29 and 91 
of the Constitution Act (British North America Act) of 1867 may follow this same pattern. 
152. See Dixon, “Constitutional Design,” ibid. 
